Financial Globalization and Risk Sharing: Welfare Effects and the Optimality of Open Markets by Trzcinka, Charles A. & Ukhov, Andrey D.
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration 
The Scholarly Commons 
Working Papers School of Hotel Administration Collection 
1-2006 
Financial Globalization and Risk Sharing: Welfare Effects and the 
Optimality of Open Markets 
Charles A. Trzcinka 
Indiana University 
Andrey D. Ukhov 
Cornell University, au53@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
 Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Trzcinka, C. A., & Ukhov, A. D. (2006). Financial globalization and risk sharing: Welfare effects and the 
optimality of open markets [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, SHA 
School site: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/6 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at 
The Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of 
The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact hotellibrary@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Financial Globalization and Risk Sharing: Welfare Effects and the Optimality of 
Open Markets 
Abstract 
To study the welfare effects of investment barriers and the opening of markets to foreigners, we 
construct an equilibrium model of international asset pricing without agency costs that allows 
endogenous market participation among heterogeneous agents. Equilibrium prices and the set of 
participating and non-participating agents are jointly determined in equilibrium and the ability of agents to 
choose to participate in the market affects prices of domestic and foreign assets. We examine the 
welfare effects of non-participation and find that when a country moves from complete segmentation to 
open markets for foreigners, the cost of capital falls in the domestic market. This is consistent with 
empirical findings in the international asset pricing literature. Through the endogenous participation 
mechanism, our model is able to capture sources of economic growth. Contrary to previous models, 
however, we show that opening markets is not Pareto-optimal and we identify a class of domestic agents 
whose welfare is lower after the opening of markets. These finding have political economy interpretations 
and policy implications. 
Keywords 
international asset pricing, capital market integration and liberalization, international risk sharing, 
International capital market equilibrium 
Disciplines 
Finance and Financial Management 
Comments 
Copyright held by the authors. 
This paper received the Best Paper Award in International Finance, MFA in Chicago. 
This working paper is available at The Scholarly Commons: https://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/workingpapers/6 
Financial Globalization and Risk Sharing: Welfare Eﬀects and the
Optimality of Open Markets
Charles A. Trzcinka Andrey D. Ukhov∗
January 2006
Abstract
To study the welfare eﬀects of investment barriers and the opening of markets to foreigners,
we construct an equilibrium model of international asset pricing without agency costs that allows
endogenous market participation among heterogeneous agents. Equilibrium prices and the set of
participating and non-participating agents are jointly determined in equilibrium and the ability
of agents to choose to participate in the market aﬀects prices of domestic and foreign assets.
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Financial Globalization and Risk Sharing: Welfare Eﬀects and the
Optimality of Open Markets
Abstract
To study the welfare eﬀects of investment barriers and the opening of markets to foreigners,
we construct an equilibrium model of international asset pricing without agency costs that allows
endogenous market participation among heterogeneous agents. Equilibrium prices and the set of
participating and non-participating agents are jointly determined in equilibrium and the ability
of agents to choose to participate in the market aﬀects prices of domestic and foreign assets. We
examine the welfare eﬀects of non-participation and find that when a country moves from complete
segmentation to open markets for foreigners, the cost of capital falls in the domestic market. This
is consistent with empirical findings in the international asset pricing literature. Through the
endogenous participation mechanism, our model is able to capture sources of economic growth.
Contrary to previous models, however, we show that opening markets is not Pareto-optimal and
we identify a class of domestic agents whose welfare is lower after the opening of markets. These
finding have political economy interpretations and policy implications.
1 Introduction
The impact of opening a country’s capital markets to foreign investors, often defined as “financial
globalization,” has been the subject of research in financial economics for over thirty years. In stan-
dard economic models, the opening of markets has major benefits. It enables investors worldwide to
share risks better, it enhances capital flow to projects where its productivity is highest and it allows
countries to reap the benefits of their comparative advantages. Yet the empirical evidence on these
benefits is mixed and the impact of financial globalization is a subject of heated political debate.
In contrast to the predictions of standard economic theory, economists have found considerable
evidence of “home bias” where an investor’s portfolio is disproportionately weighted towards stocks
of his home country. Empirical evidence also shows that a country’s investment is closely tied to
the amount it saves, that a country factor is the most important factor in asset returns and that a
firm’s country of origin is a more important determinant of its financial policies than its industry.
The political support of open markets is undermined not only by the self interest of groups who will
lose to foreign competitors but by arguments that foreign investors may force domestic investors
out from some assets and increase their risk exposure. Further political arguments are made that
foreign investors will increase a country’s exposure to external shocks.1
The classic international asset pricing models are not well-equipped to deal with this evidence
and these arguments. Black (1974), Stulz (1981a, 1981b), Errunza and Losq(1985), Eun and
Janakiramanan (1986) and Alexander, Eun and Janakiramanan (1987) incorporate investment
restrictions and focus on the portfolio problem of domestic and foreign investors, asset pricing and
1Rajan and Zingales (2003) document reversals in financial development and study empirically why some countries
become more open to capital flows than others, or open up at some times rather than at others. Stulz (2005) contains
a review of pros and cons of liberalization. See also Wincoop (1994). See Schmukler (2003) and references therein
for a discussion of benefits and risks of financial globalization. Bhagwati (1998) and Rodrik (1998, 2000) argue
that there are compelling cases for maintaining capital controls. In contrast to general perceptions that markets are
becoming more integrated, the results in Bekaert and Harvey (1995) suggest that some countries have become less
integrated into the world market over time. Measurement theory developed by Chen and Knez (1995) oﬀers a method
to measure degree of integration. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2004) document that many countries have undergone
several liberalization reversals, particularly following currency crises. Clarke, Cull, Peria, and Sánchez (2003, 2004)
document the magnitude of foreign bank presence in developing countries and investigate whether foreign bank entry
is beneficial for developing countries. See Goetzmann, Ukhov, and Zhu (2001) for a discussion of China’s case.
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the cost of capital.2 In practice these barriers can take many forms including ownership restrictions,
diﬀerential tax rates for foreigners, currency conversion restrictions and high transactions costs. In
the models, the eﬀect of the assumed barriers are to eﬀectively segment the markets so foreign and
domestic investors face diﬀerent investment opportunities.3
The evidence and political debates suggest that the opening of markets causes significant wel-
fare eﬀects in a closed economy but classical asset pricing models were not designed to address
welfare eﬀects of investment barriers. Subrahmanyam (1975a, 1975b) recognized this limitation
and constructs models that study the pricing and welfare eﬀects of fully integrating a completely
segmented market. He shows that international capital market integration is Pareto Optimal -
the welfare of individuals in the integrated economies never declines and will generally improve.
Errunza and Losq (1989) develop a multi-country framework with homogeneous agents in each
country. They, too, show that removal of investment barriers generally leads to an increase in the
aggregate market value of the aﬀected securities and all investors will favor market integration.
However, these models and all international asset pricing theories take barriers as given. The
theories do well explaining asset prices and the cost of capital when markets are liberalized and they
have guided numerous empirical studies. Their shortcoming is that models based on homogenous
agents and exogenous investment barriers are not designed to assess the welfare eﬀects of investment
barriers. They cannot provide conditions for the existence of barriers within a rational economic
framework. The empirical evidence and the political debates suggest that at least some barriers
to capital flows are part of a rational economic system and that the decision to remove barriers is
2Other important theoretical studies are: Basak (1996), Bennett and Young (1999), Grauer, Litzenberger, and
Stehle (1976), Obstfeld (1994), Dumas and Uppal (2001). For a corporate finance perspective see Adler and Dumas
(1975), Adler and Dumas (1983), Senbet (1979), Errunza and Senbet (1981), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), Stulz
(1999b), Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995), Errunza and Miller (2000). Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) use nu-
merical examples to study the eﬀects of market segmentation on asset prices, cost of capital, and corporate finance
decisions.
3Stulz (1981b) studies the implications of barriers to international investment for the composition of optimal
portfolios at home and abroad. In the Stulz model domestic investors face barriers to international investment in
the form of taxes, whereas foreign investors face no barriers to international investment. In the model some risky
foreign assets can be nontraded, in the sense that they are not held by domestic investors and would not be held if
their expected return changed slightly. For a discussion of foreign investment income taxation see also Feldstein and
Hartman (1979).
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endogenous. By not being able to address the issue of endogeneity, existing models are limited in
the guidance they can provide. A new class of models is needed to help identify potential sources
of economic opposition to the liberalization process.
A new international asset pricing theory is also needed to model the sources post-liberalization
economic growth, identified by the empirical studies (see, e.g. Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad 2004).
Classical asset pricing models, including the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and its interna-
tional counterpart, International CAPM, and the Consumption-based versions, strictly speaking,
do not model growth. The classical asset pricing models keep the composition of assets fixed. They
can generate comparative static results and predict that the cost of capital will fall when a mar-
ket becomes integrated, but CAPM-based models do not identify new projects that are financed
because of the lower cost of capital.
We develop a new modeling approach that allows heterogeneous agents to endogenously choose
whether to participate and we study the welfare eﬀects of opening markets to foreigners. Our
modeling technique allows us to focus on understanding the opposing rational economic forces that
act in an economy that opens to foreign investment.4 We assume there are two economies, domestic
and foreign, each composed of a continuum of agents who are diﬀerent in their risk exposure and
endowment income. There are no agency costs or transactions costs in this model except for a
participation cost foreign and domestic investors pay to enter risky asset market. As is standard
in the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Models, agents trade in a two-date model because they
have a motive to hedge the risk present in their endowment income. A risk-free bond is available
to all agents without any participation cost. An agent must pay a fixed participation cost to trade
risky assets and once the fee is paid the agent gains access to all risky assets. The set of agents
who decide to pay the fee and participate in the risky asset market is endogenously determined in
equilibrium as is supply and demand of the risky asset, market clearing prices and the welfare of
all agents. Endogenous decision to participate in the risky asset market is important new feature
of the model. In short, the model is a general equilibrium framework that allows us to study the
4The forces, discussed in detail later, reflect changes in supply and demand for domestic assets. When foreign
investors enter domestic security market they increase demand for domestic risky assets and supply capital to new
projects. Domestic agents who sell risky assets and receive capital, benefit. At the same time, domestic agents who
purchase domestic assets now need to compete with the foreign investors, and may see their welfare fall under partial
liberalization when compared to complete segmentation.
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behavior of these variables simultaneously.
The model builds on the foundation provided by the existent theoretical and empirical work.
Many important results have been obtained in the literature under the guidance of the international
CAPM. It is desirable that a new model aimed at explaining investment barriers be consistent with
the previous findings. Therefore, we do not depart entirely from the CAPM framework and are
able to obtain standard Consumption CAPM results as a special case of our model. Similar to
other models of international asset pricing, we show that financial globalization, that is, opening a
market to foreign investors generally reduces the country’s cost of capital even though we do not
allow domestic investors to trade in the foreign market. This is the consistent finding of empirical
work. Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000), Kim and Singal (2000) and Patro and Wald (2004)
find that stock market liberalization causes an increase in stock prices and a fall in cost of capital.5
Peria and Mody (2004) find that liberalization reduces the cost of capital supply by banks. In our
model, issuers of securities benefit two ways—the securities sell for higher prices after the market
opens and there are more participants who issue securities so capital flows increase. Projects that
could not be financed under complete segmentation are financed when markets open to foreigners
because foreign investors purchase domestic assets.
In contrast to previous models, motives to trade and participate are endogenous and we can
consider the change in welfare of the domestic agents who purchase domestic risky assets to hedge
endowment income. The decision to open markets impacts risk-sharing arrangements in the econ-
omy and aﬀects asset prices, as well as welfare of agents. The benefit of higher prices for issuers for
opening the market is a cost for domestic investors who experience a welfare loss. Participation in
the market for risk-sharing becomes more expensive and some agents decide not to participate.
Existing finance theories make predictions about changes in cost of capital in a country that
liberalizes its capital market. By developing a model with risky endowment income, heterogeneous
agents and endogenously determined participation, we are able to link the existing theories of
international asset pricing to the literature on risk sharing. The findings of this paper highlight the
eﬀect of financial globalization on risk-sharing and we show that:
5Patro and Wald (2004) use firm level data from 18 emerging markets. They find that firms’ stock returns increase
during liberalization and that a majority of firms have lower mean returns after liberalization. In the 36-month period
starting three and a half years after the liberalization date, firm returns decrease on average by a highly significant
2.88 percent per month.
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• Removal of barriers changes the composition of investors who demand risky assets causing
prices and the cost of capital to change.
• Removal of barriers may make it more expensive for some domestic agents to participate in
risk-sharing oﬀered by risky domestic assets and will lead to a decrease in their welfare.
• Investment barriers may be welfare enhancing for a country and the decision to maintain
barriers may be an endogenous, rational economic decision and not the result of agency costs
or political failure.
• The argument for liberalization may be refined by identifying the set of agents who find risk
sharing attractive after markets open.
• Since the decision to maintain investment barriers is endogenous, the timing of liberalization
in our model will not be random and will be a function of endowments, prices and risk-
exposure. This suggests that accounting for endogeneity is especially important in empirical
work.
• Our model provides a rational explanation for the historical evidence of liberalization and
reversal of liberalization found by Rajan and Zingales (2003).
If liberalization and integration are as important as classical models suggest, then it is crucial
to understand the potential negative eﬀects of the process. Our model suggests that improving
domestic capabilities for risk-sharing may be a critical factor in mitigating the negative impact of
financial globalization on some domestic consumers.6
This paper is organized as follows. General theory of international asset pricing with endogenous
participation is developed in Section 2. A class of single risk factor economies is studied in Section 3.
Section 3.3 is focused on welfare analysis. It is shown in this section that partial liberalization is not
necessarily a Pareto optimal policy. It is also shown that aggregate domestic welfare may be lower
under liberalization than under complete segmentation. Section 4 describes policy implications of
our findings and concludes.
6Kaminsky and Schmukler (2004) examine the short- and long-run eﬀects of financial liberalization on capital
markets. Their results indicate that financial liberalization is followed by more pronounced boom-bust cycles in the
short run. However, financial liberalization leads to more stable markets in the long run.
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2 General Theory
First, we develop a general theory of international asset pricing with endogenous equity market
participation. There are two sets of agents in the model, foreign investors (set F), and domestic
investors (set D). We endow each space with a measure Pd and Pf , respectively, that satisfy
Pd (D) = 1 and Pf (F) = 1. This is equivalent to viewing each element of F or D as a type, and
the measures Pd and Pf as probability distributions over all possible types. This is a one-period
model. Agents are endowed with initial wealth and receive an uncertain endowment income at the
end of the period. Agents solve a consumption-portfolio problem to maximize expected lifetime
utility of consumption. Consumption takes place at the beginning of the period (time 0) and at
the end of the period (time 1). Agents have negative exponential utility of consumption (CARA
preferences). There are two sets of assets, foreign and domestic. The assets are defined through
their expected payoﬀs at time 1, variance-covariance matrix of asset payoﬀs, and covariance between
the endowment income and asset payoﬀ. Parameters of the model are summarized in Table 1. All
random variables are assumed to be jointly Normally distributed.
In the model, segmented capital market and partially liberalized capital market are diﬀerent
with respect to the sets of assets available to diﬀerent investors. Under the benchmark case of
complete segmentation foreign investors have access to foreign assets only and domestic investors
have access to the domestic assets only. Under partial liberalization, the domestic asset market
becomes open to foreign investors; domestic investors do not have access to foreign securities. We
begin with the case of complete segmentation.
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Table 1
Variables and Parameters of the Model
Σd Variance-covariance matrix for domestic assets.
Σf Variance-covariance matrix for foreign assets.
Σd,f Matrix of covariances between domestic and foreign assets.
zd Vector of expected payoﬀs on domestic assets.
zf Vector of expected payoﬀs on foreign assets.
D The set of all domestic investors.
F The set of all foreign investors.
Wh0 Initial (time 0) wealth of investor h.eh Time 1 random endowment payoﬀ for agent h.
eh Expected time 1 endowment payoﬀ for agent h.
σ2
eh
Variance of terminal endowment for agent h.
σhe,d Vector of covariances between the endowment payoﬀ and domestic assets.
σhe,f Vector of covariances between the endowment payoﬀ and foreign assets.
kd Fixed cost that domestic investors (h ∈ D) must pay to hold domestic securities.
kf fixed cost that foreign investors (h ∈ F) must pay to hold foreign securities.
2.1 Complete Segmentation
Under complete segmentation foreign investors only hold foreign stocks and the risk-free asset and
domestic investors trade only in domestic risky securities and domestic risk-free asset. In this case
domestic investors set prices in the domestic market, and foreign investors set prices of the foreign
assets. In our model, both foreign and domestic investors first have to make a participation decision.
An investor may decide to pay the fixed cost, kd for a domestic investor or kf for a foreign investor,
and invest in the risky assets and the risk free asset available in his market. For tractability it is
assumed that all domestic investors face the same cost kd and all foreign investors face identical
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cost, kf .7 These are lifetime costs of being an investor in equity market. The costs kd and kf reflect
economic and technological development (see Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) and Basak and Cuoco
(1998) for a discussion of similar deadweight costs). Alternatively, an investor may decide not to
pay the fee and to invest in the risk-free bond only. The decision to participate is endogenous.
Subscript S denotes the values under complete segmentation, and subscript m stands for either
domestic market (m = d) or the foreign market (m = f) and is used for brevity.
A domestic investor (h ∈ D and m = d) solves consumption-portfolio problem considering in-
vestment in domestic assets only. Variables that describe the opportunity set for domestic investor
are the vector of asset expected payoﬀs zd, variance-covariance matrix for domestic assets Σd, and
vector of covariances between the endowment payoﬀ and domestic assets, σhe,d. Investor takes
equilibrium prices of risky domestic assets, pS,d, and the domestic interest rate, Rd, as given.
A foreign investor (h ∈ F and m = f) solves consumption-portfolio problem considering invest-
ment in foreign assets only. His investment opportunity set is described by zf , Σf , and σhe,f .
Investor takes equilibrium prices of risky foreign assets, pS,f , and the foreign interest rate, Rf , as
given.
Each agent makes an endogenous participation decision. To solve the participation decision
problem of an individual agent h, calculate the consumption - portfolio problem under entry and
non-entry. If the derived utility of wealth is higher under participation, investor will choose to pay
fixed amount and invest in risky assets. The participant in the risky asset market (either domestic
or foreign) solves the expected utility maximization problem
JpS,m
h
Wh0
i
= max
chS,m,0,θ
h
S,m,θ
h
S,m,0
n
−e−achS,m,0 − δEe−aechS,m,1o ,
Wh0 = c
h
S,m,0 + p
0
S,m · θhS,m + km + θhS,m,0/Rm.
with respect to three decision variables: time 0 consumption chS,m,0; time 0 post-trade holdings of
risky assets θhS,m in the investor’s respective market; and time 0 investment in the bond, θ
h
S,m,0.
The dimension of vector θhS,m equals the number of assets in the economy m. The superscript p
7 It is possible to modify the analysis so that domestic investors have a fixed cost kdd when they invest in domestic
risky assets and a diﬀerent fixed cost kdf is they want to invest in foreign risky assets. Then, a domestic investor who
holds both domestic and foreign stocks would pay a total fixed fee of kdd+k
d
f . Similarly, under this model specification,
a foreign investor would face fixed cost kff when investing in foreign risky assets and k
f
d when investing in domestic
risky assets.
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denotes the values under the optimal policy for a participant and superscript n for non-participant.
Solution to the optimization problem, including the optimal consumption-portfolio policy, is given
in the Appendix. The solution gives the following expression for the indirect utility function of a
participant,
JpS,m
h
Wh0
i
= − (1 +Rm) δ ·
exp
(
− a
1 +Rm
"
eh +Rm
³
Wh0 − km
´
+
Rm ln δRm
a
−
aσ2
eh
2
+
S2S,m (h)
2a
#)
,
where S2S,m (h) ≡
¡
zm −Rm · pS,m − aσhe,m
¢0
Σ−1m
¡
zm −Rm · pS,m − aσhe,m
¢
is the square of the
generalized Sharpe ratio, as discussed in more detail below. It measures the attractiveness of the
investment opportunity set for investor h. The opportunity set is characterized by zm, Σ−1m , and
vector of covariances σhe,m. It is clear from the above expression that the eﬀect of investment
opportunity set characteristics on investor utility is fully captured by S2S,m (h).
Non-participant in the risky asset market chooses the level of current consumption and invests
the remainder of wealth into the riskless bond to solve,
JnS,m
h
Wh0
i
= max
chS,m,0,θ
h
S,m,0
n
−e−achS,m,0 − δEe−aechS,m,1o ,
s.t. Wh0 = c
h
S,m,0 + θ
h
S,m,0/Rm.
A non-participant allocates wealthWh0 between initial consumption c
h
S,m,0 and the purchase of θ
h
S,m,0
units of the risk-free bond. Terminal consumption of a non-participant equals echS,m,1 = eh+ θhS,m,0.
Solution to the optimization problem, including the optimal consumption-portfolio policy, is given
in the Appendix. The expression for a non-participant’s derived utility of wealth function is
JnS,m
h
Wh0
i
= −δ (1 +Rm) exp
∙
− a
1 +Rm
∙
eh +RmW
h
0 +
Rm ln δRm
a
− a
2
σ2ehm
¸¸
.
Non-participants bear all the income uncertainty, the variance of terminal consumption equals
the variance of time 1 income. For a participant, the variance of terminal consumption is a function
of the variance of endowment income, the variance of the optimal portfolio of risky assets, and the
covariance between the two. Participants pay a fee to gain an opportunity to construct an optimal
portfolio and adjust the expected value and uncertainty of the terminal consumption.
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2.1.1 Participation problem
To decide whether to pay the participation fee and invest in risky assets domestic and foreign
investors compare expected utility under entry and non-entry. This comparison yields the following
participation criterion.
Theorem 1 (Participation Criterion) The investor will pay the participation fee km and invest
in risky assets available on his market when
1
2a
³
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
´0
Σ−1m
³
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
´
> Rmkm (1)
and is indiﬀerent between participation and non-participation if the relation holds with an equality.
The quantity on the left-hand-side has a natural interpretation as a generalization of Sharpe’s
performance measure. It is well known that in an economy with negative exponential utility and
Normally distributed payoﬀs agent’s portfolio problem is equivalent to selecting a vector of portfolio
holdings θhS,m to maximize the certainty equivalent E
hechS,m,1i− a2V ar hechS,m,1i. The solution is given
by θhS,m =
1
aΣ
−1
m
¡
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
¢
. The optimal value of the criterion function is increasing
in the quantity S2,
S2S,m (h) ≡
³
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
´0
Σ−1m
³
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
´
.
This is a natural generalization of Sharpe’s performance measure to the case of multiple assets
and risky agent-specific endowment. It depends on the parameters that characterize the set of
investment opportunities. These are: expected payoﬀs, zm, equilibrium asset prices pS,m, and
covariance matrix Σm. It also depends on σhe,m, the vector of covariances that determine income
hedging opportunities available to the investor. The measure is agent-specific, because it takes
into account covariances between risky assets in the economy and the agent’s random endowment
income.
Note that S2S,m (h) is unitless, so the participation criterion is independent of wealth. This is so
because negative exponential utility has no wealth eﬀect. Regardless of wealth, a participant holds
the same dollar amount of risky assets, so wealthier investors are not more likely to participate.
Participation criterion (1) highlights several important features of the market segmentation
problem. If markets are liberalized, then investors gain access to assets previously unavailable
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to them. Then quantity on the left-hand-side of the participation criterion is changed.8 It is
aﬀected by the expected returns on the new assets and by the changes in the covariance structure
of the economy. There are additional eﬀects, however, because financial liberalization also changes
the prices of risky securities. This is diﬀerent from the canonical mean-variance international
portfolio problem. In the classical mean-variance analysis addition of new assets always increases the
Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio. Therefore, in such models investors benefit from international
financial liberalization. When everyone holds the market portfolio addition of new assets improves
investment opportunities. Equilibrium analysis presented in this paper, is diﬀerent because financial
liberalization changes the set of participating agents. This aﬀects the demand for assets and causes
changes to the asset prices.
2.1.2 Equilibrium
We proceed with equilibrium analysis under complete segmentation for the domestic securities
market (h ∈ D and m = d) and for the foreign market (h ∈ F and m = f). Equilibrium prices in
each market are determined by the demand from the investors in risky assets. Define the set of
investors who pay fixed participation cost and decide to participate in their respective market,
DpS ≡
½
h ∈ D : 1
2a
³
zd −RdpS,d − aσhe,d
´0
Σ−1d
³
zd −RdpS,d − aσhe,d
´
> Rdkd
¾
,
FpS ≡
½
h ∈ F : 1
2a
³
zf −RfpS,f − aσhe,f
´0
Σ−1f
³
zf −RfpS,f − aσhe,f
´
> Rfkf
¾
.
That is, DpS ⊂ D is the subset of domestic investors who participate in the domestic securities
market. Similarly, FpS ⊂ F is the subset of foreign investors who participate in the foreign securities
market. For brevity, we use MS to denote the set of market participants in either domestic¡MS = DpS¢ or a foreign ¡MS = FpS¢ market.
The demand for risky assets comes from market participants in the domestic or foreign market.
Assets are in zero net supply in both markets, so the market clearing price pS,m is determined from
0 =
Z
MS
θhpS,mdP
m (h) =
Z
MS
1
a
Σ−1m
³
zm −RmpS,m − aσhe,m
´
dPm (h) .
8The quantity on the right-hand-side also may change if investors need to bear additional fixed costs when investing
abroad.
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Define the average random terminal endowment of market participants as
eMS = Z
MS
ehdPm (h) .
The following result obtains.
Theorem 2 (Equilibrium Asset Prices) In equilibrium under complete market segmentation,
the price of risky asset i from the market m is given by
pS,m (i) =
1
Rm
∙
z (i)− a
Pm (MS)Cov
¡ez (i) , eMS¢¸ .
Proof. Multiply both sides of
0 =
Z
MS
θhpS,mdP
m (h)
by aΣm and use the definition of eMS .
When all agents participate in the risky asset market, P (MS) = 1, and the pricing result
becomes the standard Consumption CAPM result (assets are priced by their covariance with the
aggregate endowment). Assets that provide a good hedge are more valuable and command a higher
price. In the model with endogenous participation the quality of hedging provided by an asset is
measured by a weighted average covariance term that takes into account income characteristics of
the set of participating agents. This term is
Cov
¡ez (i) , eMS¢ = Covµez (i) ,Z
MS
ehdPm (h)¶ = Z
MS
Cov
³ez (i) , eh´ dPm (h) .
2.2 Partial Liberalization
Partial liberalization takes place when a country opens its stock market to foreign investors, but
barriers remain that preclude its residents from investing abroad. In our setting, partial liberal-
ization means that foreign investors can hold foreign and domestic risky assets and that domestic
investors can hold only domestic risky assets. Foreign investors also hold the foreign risk-free asset
but not the domestic bond. Domestic investors hold the domestic bond and do not have access
to the foreign risk-free security. We interpret the bond available to domestic investors not as an
asset that has no risk, but as a storage technology. In many countries such storage technology
amounts to holding cash in US dollars or in Euro. Both foreign and domestic investors first make
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a participation decision. An investor may decide to pay the fixed cost, kd for a domestic investor
or kf for a foreign investor, and invest in risky assets within his opportunity set. Alternatively, an
investor may decide to invest in a risk-free bond only. The decision to participate is endogenous.
Subscript P denotes the values under partial liberalization.
2.2.1 Domestic Investors
A domestic investor faces the same opportunity set as in the case of complete segmentation, defined
by zd, Σd, σhe,d, and Rd, except prices of domestic risky assets are diﬀerent under partial liberal-
ization and complete segmentation, pP,d 6= pS,d. Partial liberalization aﬀects domestic investors
through changes in the prices of domestic risky assets. Domestic participant solves a utility maxi-
mization problem identical to the case of strong segmentation, described in detail in the Appendix.
All analytical expressions are the same as in the complete segmentation case, with the new vector
of risky asset prices, pP,d, substituted in place of the old prices, pS,d. The participant’s indirect
utility function is
JpP,d
h
Wh0
i
= − (1 +Rd) δ ·
exp
(
− a
1 +Rd
"
eh +Rd
³
Wh0 − kd
´
+
Rd ln δRd
a
−
aσ2
eh
2
+
S2P,d (h)
2a
#)
,
where S2P,d (h) ≡
³
zd −Rd · pP,d − aσhe,d
´0
Σ−1d
³
zd −Rd · pP,d − aσhe,d
´
Optimization problem of domestic non-participant is identical to the case of strong segmenta-
tion. The non-participant’s indirect utility function is
JnP,d
h
Wh0
i
= −δ (1 +Rd) exp
∙
− a
1 +Rd
∙
eh +RdW
h
0 +
Rd ln δRd
a
− a
2
σ2
ehd
¸¸
.
The participation criterion is obtained by substituting risky asset prices of pP,d into (1). A domestic
investor will pay the participation fee kd and invest in domestic risky assets when
1
2a
³
zd −RdpP,d − aσhe,d
´0
Σ−1d
³
zd −RdpP,d − aσhe,d
´
> Rdkd.
Generally, domestic investors can be classified into four types. Type A investors participate
in the domestic risky asset market before and after partial liberalization. Type B investors never
participate in the risky asset market. Type C agents participate if and only if partial liberalization
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takes place and Type D investors participate if and only if partial liberalization does not takes
place. For types A and B financial liberalization does not aﬀect participation. For types C and D
the opposite is true, their participation decision is aﬀected by the liberalization decision.
2.2.2 Foreign Investors
Partial liberalization changes risky investment opportunities available to a foreign investor. The
vector of expected payoﬀs z, the variance-covariance matrix of asset payoﬀs Σ, and the vector of
covariances between the endowment payoﬀ and all available assets are now given by,
z ≡
⎛
⎝ zd
zf
⎞
⎠ ; Σ ≡
⎛
⎝ Σd Σd,f
Σ
0
d,f Σf
⎞
⎠ ; σhe ≡
⎛
⎝ σ
h
e,d
σhe,f
⎞
⎠ .
Foreign investor who participates in the risky asset market solves
JpP,f
h
Wh0
i
= max
chP,f,0,θ
h
P,f ,θ
h
P,f,0
n
−e−ac
h
P,f,0 − δEe−aechP,f,1o ,
Wh0 = c
h
P,f,0 + p
0
P · θhP,f + kf + θhP,f,0/Rf .
with respect to time 0 consumption chP,f,0; time 0 post-trade holdings of risky assets θ
h
P,f ; and
time 0 investment in the bond, θhP,f,0. The dimension of vector θ
h
P,f equals the number of both
domestic and foreign assets. The vector of prices includes prices of domestic and foreign risky
assets, pP =
³
p0P,d,p
0
P,f
´0
. Optimal consumption-portfolio policy is given in the Appendix. Foreign
participant’s indirect utility function is,
JpP,f
h
Wh0
i
= − (1 +Rf ) δ ·
exp
(
− a
1 +Rf
"
eh +Rf
³
Wh0 − kf
´
+
Rf ln δRf
a
−
aσ2
eh
2
+
S2P,f (h)
2a
#)
,
where S2P,f (h) ≡
¡
z−Rf · pP − aσhe
¢0
Σ−1
¡
z−Rf · pP − aσhe
¢
.
The optimization problem and the indirect utility function of a foreign non-participant, are
identical to the case of strong segmentation. The participation criterion is obtained by substituting
pP , z, Σ, and σhe into (1). A foreign investor will pay the participation fee kf and invest in foreign
and domestic risky assets when
1
2a
³
z−RfpP − aσhe
´0
Σ−1
³
z−RfpP − aσhe
´
> Rfkf .
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Generally, there are four types of foreign investors. These types are similar to the four types of
domestic investors. Type A investors participate in the risky asset market before and after partial
liberalization. Type B investors never participate in the risky asset market. Type C agents
participate if and only if partial liberalization takes place and Type D investors participate if and
only if partial liberalization does not takes place.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Under Partial Liberalization
In equilibrium under partial liberalization, participation among domestic and foreign investors, and
prices of risky assets in both foreign and domestic markets are jointly determined. Asset prices of
foreign securities are determined by the demand from participating foreign investors. Asset prices
of domestic securities are determined by the demand from foreign and domestic participants. The
sets of participants are in turn determined by asset prices. Define the set of investors who pay fixed
participation cost and participate when domestic market is partially liberalized,
DpP ≡
½
h ∈ D : 1
2a
³
zd −RdpP,d − aσhe,d
´0
Σ−1d
³
zd −RdpP,d − aσhe,d
´
> Rdkd
¾
,
FpP ≡
½
h ∈ F : 1
2a
³
z−RfpP − aσhe
´0
Σ−1
³
z−RfpP − aσhe
´
> Rfkf .
¾
,
where pP ≡
¡
p0P,d,p
0
P,f
¢0
.
That is, DpP ⊂ D is the subset of domestic investors and FpP ⊂ F is the subset of foreign investors
who participate in the partially liberalized securities market. As before, MP,m denotes the set of
market participants in market m (m = d or m = f). The sets DpP and FpP and asset prices, pP,d
and pP,f are jointly determined in equilibrium. Define the average terminal endowment of market
participants from each market as
eDpP = Z
DpP
ehdPd (h) , eFpP = Z
FpP
ehdPf (h) .
The demand for foreign stocks comes from foreign investors only. This is exactly as in the case
of complete segmentation. Hence, the price of a risky asset i from the foreign market is given by,
pP,f (i) =
1
Rf
"
z (i)− a
Pf
¡FpP ¢Cov
³ez (i) , eFpP ´# .
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The demand for domestic stocks comes from both foreign and domestic participants. Assets are
in zero net supply in both markets, so the vector of market clearing prices pP,d is determined from
0 =
Z
DpP
θhpP,ddP
d (h) +
Z
FpP
θhpP,fdP
f (h)
=
Z
DpP
1
a
Σ−1d
³
zd −Rd · pP,d − aσhe,d
´
dPd (h)
+
Z
FpP
1
a
Σ−1
³
z−Rf ·
¡
p0P,d,p
0
P,f
¢0 − aσhe´ dPf (h) .
As previously shown, under complete segmentation domestic assets are priced by their covari-
ance with the endowment of domestic participants only. When barriers to foreign investment are
removed, domestic risky assets are priced by covariance between the asset payoﬀ and the endow-
ment of both foreign and domestic market participants. Comparing the expressions for domestic
asset price under complete segmentation and partial liberalization, we conclude that partial liber-
alization generally causes the price of domestic assets to change, because it changes the covariance
structure between assets and endowments for the domestic securities. In a recent study using firm-
level data from 18 emerging markets, Patro and Wald (2004) report evidence consistent with this
model. They find that emerging market firms have increased exposure to the world market and
decreased exposure to the home market following liberalization.9 Our results in the general case
show that removal of investment barriers aﬀects prices and, therefore, the pattern of participation
among domestic and foreign agents. Changing prices and changing participation leads to welfare
eﬀect. It is impossible to characterize this welfare eﬀect without further describing the risks of this
economy. Even though some domestic agents remain non-participants they may gain in utility. In
the next section we show with a simple factor model and a uniform distribution of factors that
there can be a welfare loss for both participants and non-participants and an aggregate loss for the
economy.
9This is also consistent with findings in Bekaert and Harvey (1995, 1997) who show that the eﬀect of world factors
on domestic stock market is a function of market integration and the influence of global factors could increase after
foreign investment liberalizations.
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3 A Single Factor Model
Assume that endowment and asset payoﬀs are described by a linear factor model,
eh = eh + bhd efd + eεhm, h ∈ D (2)
eh = eh + bhf eff + eεhm, h ∈ F (3)
ezd = zd + βd efd + eεd, (4)
ezf = zf + βf eff + eεf . (5)
There are two risk factors, domestic, efd, and foreign, eff . Random variables eεh, eεd, and eεf represent
residual (idiosyncratic) risks. All random variables are independent and are Normally distributed.
A domestic agent (h ∈ D) has an agent-specific loading bhd on the domestic risk factor. A foreign
agent (h ∈ F) has an agent-specific loading bhf on the foreign risk factor. There is one domestic
risky asset and one foreign risky asset (each representing the market portfolio of the corresponding
market). The payoﬀ on domestic asset depends on the domestic risk factor. The payoﬀ on the
foreign asset depends on the foreign factor. It is assumed that eh = bhd ,∀h ∈ D and eh = bhf ,∀h ∈ F .
The usual assumptions about the factors and the error terms are made (m = d, f):
E
heεhi = E [eεm] = E h efmi = 0,
E
heεheεdi = E heεheεfi = E [eεdeεf ] = E heεh efmi = E heεm efmi = E h efd effi = 0,
E
∙³eεh´2¸ = σ2εhm , E £eε2d¤ = σ2εd , E £eε2f¤ = σ2εf ,
E
h ef2di = E h ef2f i = 1.
All error terms and factors are mutually independent. Total variance of asset m is V ar [ezm] =
β2m + σ
2
εm = σ
2
zm .
It is also necessary to specify the distributions of factor loadings in the population of domestic
and foreign investors. It is assumed that the endowment factor loadings are independent in the
population of foreign investors from the population of domestic investors, with probability density
functions PDF f
³
bhf
´
and PDF d
¡
bhd
¢
.
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3.1 Complete Segmentation
As discussed in the general case, in equilibrium the set of market participants and the price of
risky assets are jointly determined for both domestic and foreign markets. Under complete market
segmentation, equilibrium in each market is described by the following system of equations,10
pS,m =
1
Rm
∙
zm −
a
Pm (MS)Cov
¡ezm, eMS¢¸
MS ≡
(
h : S2S,m (h) ≡ a2
β2m
β2m + σ2εm
h
bMSm − bhm
i2
> 2aRmkm
)
,
Cov
¡ezm, eMS¢ = βm Z
MS
bhmdPm (h) ,
eMS ≡ Z
MS
ehdPm (h) , bMSm ≡ 1Pm (MS)
Z
MS
bhmdPm (h) .
The last equation defines bMSm , the average loading on the market risk factor among the participants
in the risky asset market m. Participation criterion indicates that the set of market participants
consists of agents whose factor loadings bhm are suﬃciently far away from the market average loading
bMSm . For these agents the benefits measured by S2S,m (h) are suﬃciently high to justify the entrance
fee.
The ratio α2m ≡ β2m/
¡
β2m + σ
2
εm
¢
is the ratio of variance of the asset payoﬀ from the factor
risk to the total asset payoﬀ variance. It is the measure of quality of hedging that the risky asset
provides. Agents want to hedge the factor risk. If asset idiosyncratic variance is very low, σ2εm ≈ 0,
then almost all of the asset variance comes from the factor risk, α2m ≈ 1 and the asset provides a
good hedge. Conversely, if idiosyncratic variance dominates, σ2εm >> β
2
m, then the asset does not
provide a good hedge, and α2m is low. In this case, holding all else equal, the left-hand-side of the
participation criterion is relatively small, aﬀecting participation decision.
Factor loadings of participating investors are suﬃciently far away from the market average
loading. This is evident since the solution set for inequality a (b− x)2 > c is x ∈
³
−∞, b−
p
c/a
´
∪³
b+
p
c/a,+∞
´
. Define Km ≡ 2aRmkm/
¡
a2α2m
¢
. Then
Pm (MS) =
Z bMSm −√Km
−∞
PDFm
³
bhm
´
dbhm +
Z +∞
b
MS
m +
√
Km
PDFm
³
bhm
´
dbhm
10See Appendix for details.
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and bMSm is the solution to
1
Pm (MS)
"Z bMSm −√Km
−∞
bhmPDF
³
bhm
´
dbhm +
Z +∞
b
MS
m +
√
Km
bhmPDF
m
³
bhm
´
dbhm
#
= bMSm .
The set of participating agents is thenMS =
¡
−∞, bMSm −
√
Km
¢
∪
¡
bMSm +
√
Km,+∞
¢
.
The analysis so far did not rely on any assumptions about the distribution of factor loadings in
the population. Assume that the factor loading has a uniform distribution, bhm ∼ Uniform
¡
bminm , b
max
m
¢
,
PDFm
¡
bhm
¢
= 1/
¡
bmaxm − bminm
¢
.11 Then, by direct computation
Pm (MS) = b
max
m − bminm − 2
√
Km
bmaxm − bminm
and bMSm =
1
2
¡
bmaxm + b
min
m
¢
.
The center of mass in this economy, bMSm , is a constant.
The relative price of the risky asset is
pS,m/R
−1
m = zm − a · βm · bMSm = zm − a · βm ·
1
2
¡
bmaxm + b
min
m
¢
.
The assumption that factor loadings have uniform distribution is made for tractability. It allows
us to focus on a simple symmetric case, without forcing a more restrictive distribution of factor risks
on the economy. The assumption points to the role that the distribution of systematic endowment
risk among agents has on the risky asset price. It is also important for the eﬀect that a changing
investor participation may have on the price of a risky asset. For example, if the participation
fee is lowered, more agents will participate, but the average factor loading among participants will
stay constant and the relative price of the risky asset will not change. Thus, even though more
agents will enter the market for the risky asset, the price of the asset will not change. This happens
because there is a symmetry among the new entrants. There will be as many new investors buying
the asset as there will be new investors selling it short. An increase in demand will be matched to
the increase in the supply and the price will remain unchanged.
11The assumption of uniformly distributed factor loadings is not necessary to obtain our main results. This assump-
tion is made for analytical tractability when aggregating across agents. Our results obtain with other distributions
of agents. The assumption of uniform distribution has one added benefit. It is a neutral assumption about the
distribution of diﬀerent agent types. By making this assumption we do not make statements about the prevalence of
any type of agent in the domestic and foreign economies. All agent types have equal weight and we do not introduce
any biases.
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Figure 1 illustrates the eﬀect of “asset quality” (α2d) on participation decision. The figure shows
the boundaries of the set of domestic participating agents in the case of complete segmentation as
a function of domestic participation cost, kd. Participant set is the set of values outside of the
boundary line. The relationship between the boundaries and the participation cost is shown for
two values of domestic idiosyncratic variance, σ2εd , “low” and “high.” When the idiosyncratic
variance is low, the quality of the asset is high, and the set of participating agents (the area outside
of the boundary) is larger. When the idiosyncratic variance is high the quality of the asset is
lower from the point of view of domestic agents, and consequently, a smaller set of agents finds it
beneficial to participate in the risky asset market.
3.2 Partial Liberalization
Four quantities are jointly determined in equilibrium: the sets of domestic
¡DpP ¢ and foreign ¡FpP ¢
participating agents, and the prices of risky assets, pP,d and pP,f .
A domestic investor h ∈ D participates if and only if S2P (h) > 2aRdkd. For participating
domestic agents factor loadings bhd satisfy:³
zd −RdpP,d − abhdβd
´2
> 2aRdkdV ar [ezd] , h ∈ D
The boundaries of the set of participating agents, DpP , are given by the solution to the quadratic
equation that correspond to the above inequality,
DpP =
µ
−∞, zd −RdpP,d
aβd
−
p
Kd
¶
∪
µ
zd −RdpP,d
aβd
+
p
Kd,+∞
¶
For a uniform distribution bhd ∼ Uniform
¡
bmind , b
max
d
¢
, it is shown in the Appendix that
DpP =
Ã
−∞, b
DS,d
d
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢ −
p
Kd
!
∪
Ã
b
DS,d
d
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢ +
p
Kd,+∞
!
Pd
¡DpP ¢ = 1− 2p2aRdkdV ar [ezd]βda ¡bmaxd − bmind ¢ = Pd ¡DpS¢ .
As previously defined, bDSd =
1
2
¡
bmaxm + b
min
m
¢
is the center of mass in the domestic economy under
complete segmentation.
A foreign investor participates if and only if S2f (h) > 2aRfkf . For a foreign investor the
generalized Sharpe ratio is given by
S2P (h) =
1
V ar [ezd] (zd −RfpP,d)2 + 1V ar [ezf ]
³
zf −RfpP,f − abhfβf
´2
.
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The set of foreign participants is, therefore, determined by a quadratic equation in bhf , which enters
the expression above through the terms that contain eh. Solving the quadratic equation, we obtain
boundaries of the participation set,
bh∗f =
(zf −RfpP,f )
aβf
−
√
C
aβf
p
V ar [ezd] ,
bh∗∗f =
(zf −RfpP,f )
aβf
+
√
C
aβf
p
V ar [ezd] ,
√
C ≡
q
V ar [ezf ]q2aRfkfV ar [ezd]− (zd −RfpP,d)2.
Since the rays of the parabola are pointing upward, the set of participating foreign agents is
FpP =
³
−∞, bh∗f
´
∪
³
bh∗∗f ,+∞
´
.
The price of the foreign asset is the same as under complete segmentation, and is given by
pP,f = pSf =
1
Rf
∙
zf − aβf
bmax + bmin
2
¸
.
The price of domestic asset is,12
zd − pP,dRd = aβd
bmind + b
max
d
2
£
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢¤ ,
where
Pf
¡FpP ¢ = 1− 2√C
aβf
p
V ar [ezd]³bmaxf − bminf ´ .
To see the eﬀect of partial liberalization on domestic asset price, compare domestic risk premium
under partial liberalization and complete segmentation.
Theorem 3 Consider a CARA-Normal economy with endogenous participation and with hetero-
geneous agents. Let asset returns and endowment payoﬀs be generated according to a linear factor
structure (2)—(5). Under partial liberalization, the absolute value of the risk premium falls in the
domestic market.
12We make a standard assumption in the literature: Rf = Rd (the assumption of equal worldwide interest rates is
made for example by Errunza and Losq (1989)).
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Proof. The expressions for the risk premium under partial liberalization and under complete
segmentation, respectively, are:
zd − pP,dRd = aβd
bmind + b
max
d
2
£
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢¤ , and zd − pS,dRd = aβd b
max
d + b
min
d
2
.
Since 0 < Pf
¡FpP ¢ < 1, the absolute value of the risk premium falls in the domestic market.
The result that the absolute value of the risk premium falls with liberalization is a standard re-
sult in international CAPM. We show that the result holds in a general equilibrium with incomplete
markets (GEI) setting.
Corollary 4 Suppose domestic asset has a positive beta, βd > 0, and domestic economy has a
positive center of mass, bDSd > 0. This is the case that corresponds to a classical international
CAPM (a positive expected return on a market portfolio). Then, domestic risk premium is positive
under complete segmentation and falls under partial liberalization. The price of domestic risky asset
rises.
Proof. Domestic risk premium under complete segmentation is positive because, by assumption
βd > 0 and b
DS
d =
1
2
¡
bmaxm + b
min
m
¢
> 0.
Figure 2 illustrates the eﬀect of partial liberalization on the set of domestic participants. The
figure shows participation set under complete segmentation, with the center of mass of the economy
bDSd . Suppose the initial center of mass is positive, b
DS
d > 0 (the economy has a positive exposure
to the risk factor). This case is represented on the bottom diagram of the figure. After partial
liberalization foreign agents enter the economy and the center of mass shifts to the left,
bDPd = b
DS
d ·
1
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢ < bDSd .
In this case there will be more domestic participants with factor loadings exceeding bDPd entering
the market. Some domestic agents with factor loadings less than bDPd will stop participating.
Suppose now that the initial center of mass is negative, bDSd < 0 (the top diagram of Figure
2). The center of mass shifts to the right in this case. Some domestic agents with factor loadings
less than bDPd will enter the market in this case, and some agents with factor loadings exceeding
bDPd will stop participating.
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3.3 Welfare Analysis
A move from complete segmentation to partial liberalization aﬀects aggregate welfare through two
channels. First, liberalization decision may have a positive or a negative eﬀect on the welfare of
each individual agent. Welfare of individual agents is aﬀected because the investment opportunity
set changes, and because risky assets are available at prices that are diﬀerent from the complete
segmentation prices. Second, liberalization decision aﬀects the composition of agents in the econ-
omy. Some participants may become non-participants, and some non-participants may be drawn
to the market.
According to previously introduced classification, in both foreign and domestic markets there
are Type B investors who never participate in the risky asset market. For each such agent, indirect
utility function does not depend on the set of risky assets and their prices. Partial liberalization,
therefore, will have no eﬀect on the utility of each such agent. Liberalization changes prices of risky
assets and therefore will aﬀect foreign and domestic investors who participate in the risky asset
market. Liberalization will have an eﬀect on investors that always participate (Type A), as well as
investors who change their participation decision because liberalization takes place (Type C and
Type D).
3.3.1 Domestic Market
Type A domestic investors participate in the domestic risky asset market both under partial
liberalization and complete segmentation. For an agent of this type welfare is aﬀected because lib-
eralization changes prices of domestic assets. For a type A agent welfare under partial liberalization
exceeds the welfare under complete segmentation if and only if the agent’s generalized Sharpe ratio
increases after liberalization,
S2P,d (h) > S
2
S,d (h)³
zd − pP,dRd − aβdbhd
´2
>
³
zd − pS,dRd − aβdbhd
´2
Ã
bDSd
1
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢ − bhd
!2
>
³
bDSd − b
h
d
´2
,
where the last expression is obtained by substituting the expressions for domestic risk premium
and the definitions of the center of mass in the economy. Partial liberalization changes the location
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of the center of mass in the domestic economy. An agent’s Sharpe ratio increases and the agent
benefits from partial liberalization if there is an increase in the distance between his factor loading
and the center of mass (the center of mass moves away from him under partial liberalization). The
agent whose factor loading is bh,0d =
1
2
³
bDPd + b
DS
d
´
is indiﬀerent (the utility of this agent does not
change with partial liberalization).
It was shown that when initial center of mass is positive it moves to the left under partial
liberalization (Figure 2). Therefore, all agents located to the right of the original center of mass³
bhd > b
DS
d
´
will have an increase in utility after partial liberalization. Conversely, all agents located
to the left of the original center of mass will have a decrease in utility. If the original center of
mass in the economy was negative, then it will move to the right under partial liberalization (top
diagram of Figure 2). Then utility increases for the agents located to the left of the original center
of mass, and decreases for those located to the right. This established the following result.13
Theorem 5 Partial liberalization is not a Pareto-optimal policy in a domestic market with a non-
zero (positive or negative) average factor loading.
Is it possible to determine whether there are “more” type A agents who gain than there are
those who lose? When factor loadings are uniformly distributed, it is possible to compute the
measure of the set of those who gain and of those who lose. The measure is the length of the
interval. If the center of mass in the economy is positive so that partial liberalization shifts the
center of mass to the left, the set of Type A domestic investors is given by
A [D] =
³
bmind , b
DP
d −
p
Kd
´
∪
³
bDSd +
p
Kd, b
max
d
´
.
Then it can be shown that as long as Pf
¡FpP ¢ > 0, the measure of the set of type A agents whose
utility increases is larger than the measure of the set of agents whose utility falls:
Pd
³
bDSd +
p
Kd, b
max
d
´
> Pd
³
bmind , b
DP
d −
p
Kd
´
.
We conclude that under the assumption of a positive center of mass, there are more type A agents
who see partial liberalization as a beneficial policy than type A agents whose welfare falls with
liberalization.
13As discussed earlier, the assumption of uniformly distributed factor loadings is not crucial to this non-Pareto
optimality result. The result is robust to the choice of the distribution of agent factor loadings.
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If the center of mass in the economy is negative, then the set of Type A domestic investors is
given by
A [D] =
³
bmind , b
DS
d −
p
Kd
´
∪
³
bDPd +
p
Kd, b
max
d
´
.
In this case, too, as long as Pf
¡FpP ¢ > 0, the measure of the set of type A agents whose utility
increases is larger than the measure of the set of agents whose utility falls:
Pd
³
bmind , b
DS
d −
p
Kd
´
> Pd
³
bDPd +
p
Kd, b
max
d
´
.
There are “more” Type A agents with an increase in welfare. Does it imply that the aggregate
welfare of type A domestic agents is necessarily higher under partial liberalization? The answer is
no. There may be more agents with improved utility, but the decline in utility of those who lose
may be larger in magnitude, so that the overall eﬀect of partial liberalization may be negative.
Theorem 6 Suppose the center of mass of the domestic economy under complete segmentation is
positive, bDSd > 0. Then, there exist such domestic and foreign economies that the total utility of
domestic investors of Type A decreases after liberalization.
The proof is in the Appendix. The proposition establishes that the aggregate welfare of domes-
tic Type A agents may fall under partial liberalization. The amount by which aggregate welfare
falls is a function of the parameters that describe the domestic and foreign economies. For example,
the amount of change in aggregate welfare depends on the domestic participation cost, kd. The
relationship, however, is not monotone and depends on other parameters. Figure 3 is a plot of
the change in aggregate welfare of domestic Type A investors as a function of kd, plotted for three
diﬀerent values of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd (low, intermediate, and high vari-
ance). Change in welfare equals welfare under partial liberalization minus welfare under complete
segmentation. A higher idiosyncratic variance makes domestic asset less desirable for hedging by
domestic agents. Since the asset is relatively less desirable in the cases of higher idiosyncratic risk,
the fall in aggregate utility is smaller. When idiosyncratic risk is low and the asset is more desirable
the fall in aggregate utility is larger. This corresponds with economic intuition that agents will
loose more utility when something with a relatively high economic value (a good hedging asset) be-
comes less accessible or costs more. When idiosyncratic risk is suﬃciently low, there is a monotonic
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relationship between the drop in aggregate welfare and participation cost. Higher participation
cost corresponds to a larger drop in welfare.
Figure 4 is a plot of the change in aggregate welfare of Type A domestic agents shown against
the foreign participation cost, for three diﬀerent levels of domestic asset idiosyncratic volatility.
In all three cases, the fall in welfare decreases as the foreign participation cost increases. Higher
values of kf mean that less foreign agents will enter the market. Since eﬀect on welfare comes from
foreign entrants who impact the price, less entrance leads to a smaller negative impact on welfare.
Conversely, when foreign investors have a low cost of entrance, the welfare loss of Type A domestic
investors is larger.
Aggregate welfare in the domestic economy. It is established already that there is a
group of domestic agents whose welfare decreases with partial liberalization. Liberalization has an
eﬀect on the welfare of type A, C, and D agents, and does not aﬀect the welfare of type B agents
who never participate in the risky asset market. Not only will there be some agents in the domestic
economy who are worse oﬀ under partial liberalization than under complete segmentation, but a
stronger result also obtains. There are non-trivial cases when aggregate welfare in the domestic
economy is lower under partial liberalization than under complete segmentation.
Theorem 7 Suppose the center of mass of the domestic economy under complete segmentation is
positive, bDSd > 0. Then, there exist such domestic and foreign economies that the total utility of
domestic investors is lower under partial liberalization than under complete segmentation.
The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix. This result is important because it demonstrates
that not only some agents can have lower welfare under liberalization, but the society overall may
be worse oﬀ. Figure 5 is a plot of the change in aggregate domestic welfare as a function of foreign
participation cost, plotted for three diﬀerent values of domestic asset idiosyncratic risk. The figure
shows that the change in welfare is negative: aggregate domestic welfare is higher under complete
segmentation than under partial liberalization. For three level of idiosyncratic volatility, the fall in
welfare decreases as foreign participation cost increases. When values of kf are higher, less foreign
agents will enter domestic market. This leads to a smaller impact on the price of domestic asset
and a smaller impact on the aggregate domestic welfare. Similarly to the case of Type A domestic
agents, we observe a larger impact on domestic welfare when idiosyncratic risk is low, compared to
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the case when the risk is high. An asset with relatively low idiosyncratic risk provides better hedging
and is more desirable. Figure 6 displays the change in aggregate domestic welfare as a function
of domestic participation cost, kd, for three diﬀerent values of domestic asset idiosyncratic risk.
Similar to previously reported results, the change in welfare is more pronounced when domestic
asset has low idiosyncratic risk and provides better hedging.
Impact on individual domestic agents. In a heterogeneous economy partial liberalization
has diﬀerent implications for welfare of diﬀerent domestic agents. Agents who do not participate in
the risky asset market either under segmentation or under partial liberalization will not be aﬀected.
Agents who supply, or sell, domestic risky asset will benefit when partial liberalization causes risk
premium to fall and the price of the risky asset to rise. At the same time, domestic agents who
demand, or purchase, domestic asset will experience a decrease in utility when partial liberalization
raises the asset price. It was shown above that the cumulative economy-wide eﬀect is non-trivial,
and aggregate welfare under liberalization may be lower than under partial segmentation. Figure
7 is a plot of utility level of domestic agents. The agents’ factor loading, bhd , is on the x-axis and
the utility level is on the y-axis. Two charts are shown, for the case of complete segmentation and
for partial liberalization. Dashed vertical lines show the boundaries between diﬀerent agent types.
Type A agents participate in the risky asset market under both segmentation and liberalization
regimes and occupy the extreme left and right regions of the diagram. Type A agents located in
the negative half-plane (to the left of the origin) lose utility under liberalization. For these agents
utility is higher under segmentation. Type A agents located in the positive half-plane (to the right
of the origin) have higher utility under liberalization than under segmentation. In the middle of the
diagram there is a group of agents who never participate (Type B). For these agents utility level
is the same under segmentation and liberalization, and two graphs coincide. A narrow strip in the
negative half-plane, between Type A and Type B agents is the set of agents of Type D. These agents
participate in the risky asset market under complete segmentation and do not participate if the
economy is liberalized. Their utility is higher when markets are segmented. Finally, a narrow strip
in the positive half-plane, to the right of the Type B investors corresponds to Type C agents. These
agents participate only under partial liberalization and their utility is higher under liberalization.
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3.3.2 Political Economy of Market Liberalizations
Theorem 7 demonstrates the possibility that a partially liberalized economy may lower the total
utility for domestic investors. Whether this happens depends on the political decision of the country.
The single factor model with a uniform distribution of factor loading provides a benchmark for the
political decision to open under the assumption that the majority of the voters always determines
government policy. If agents act economically rationally, the participants will vote to open when
their welfare increases after participation and vote to close when their welfare decreases. Rational
non-participants will not vote. In an economy with a uniform distribution of factor loadings there
will be exactly as many “no” votes as “yes” votes. The area in figure 2 for the participants who
lose welfare is exactly equal to the area for participants who gain. While the set of type A agents
who gain is larger than those who lose (see discussion following Theorem 5), the number of non-
participants will increase because of welfare loss and will exactly oﬀsetting the gain in type A
agents. Essentially, there equally many agents who desire to pledge future income - those who sell
an asset - as agents who desire to buy the asset to receive a payoﬀ in the future. Rational voting
will never change this economy.
In a richer and more realistic model, the distribution of factor loadings will not be uniform. If
the number of sellers of claims against future income is greater than number of buyers, the economy
will have an optimistic outlook to the future. In an optimistic economy, rational voting will be in
favor of liberalization. The economy will open to foreigners, the cost of capital will fall and the
gain in type A agents will not be oﬀset by the increase in non-participants. It is still possible that
the welfare loss from opening will exceed the welfare gain but the majority rules and the economy
will open. Note that “optimism” is not a psychological state. We define the word economically
where more agents have a demand for selling the asset
³
negative post-trade holdings, θhpS < 0
´
than agents with positive demand for the asset, θhpS > 0, who need future payoﬀ from the asset to
supplement the endowment income.
If the number of sellers of claims is less than the buyers, the economy will have a pessimistic
outlook, where the demand for hedging is larger than the supply and agents need to purchase
an asset to supplement future endowment payoﬀ to satisfy consumption needs. In this case, the
number of agents who lose welfare from opening will exceed the number who gain and the rational
majority will vote to close the economy.
28
It is clear from the results of this paper that an economy will remain in steady state only when
the liberalization status (“open” or “closed”) is consistent with the distribution of the factor load-
ings. This is supported by the findings of Rajan and Zingales (2003) who show that liberalizations
have been routinely reversed in developed countries during the 20th century. In particular, many of
the reversals happened after the crash of 1929 (see tables 2-5 of their paper) which generated a huge
demand for hedging. Countries closed markets to foreigners which, from the view of our paper,
was an economically rational response to a re-distribution of factor loadings. While the “interest
group” theory of rent-seeking advanced by Rajan and Zingales is consistent with their data, so is
a rational economic model with a political system that is governed by a rational majority.
3.3.3 Economic Significance
James Madison described a “majority rule” government as the “tyranny of the majority” and most
democracies have political mechanisms in place to give strong minorities some influence. If we
interpret a strong minority opinion as one where the liberalization decision causes a large welfare
loss, then we need to evaluate the significance of changes in welfare. Whether or not the policy of
economic openness receives strong and vocal supporters or critics depends on the magnitude of the
impact. If the economic significance of the welfare impact is small, then it is not likely that we will
observe a strong opposition. If the opposite is true and there is a group of agents who experience
a large drop in welfare, we can expect an active political resistance from this group. Of course, the
same holds for supporters. Active support for liberalization and even lobbying will emerge when
there is a group that stands to gain a significant amount from the policy of open markets.
One method to evaluate economic significance of changes in domestic welfare is to consider
percent change in welfare. Figure 8 shows percent changes in aggregate domestic welfare as a
function of foreign participation fee, kf , plotted for three levels of domestic asset idiosyncratic risk.
Welfare loss ranges from 4.24% for a low foreign participation fee to 0.5% for a very high foreign
participation cost and high idiosyncratic risk. This is the loss in aggregate welfare, and utility loss
experienced by many agents is compensated in the calculation by the utility gain of the others.
The utility loss or gain experienced by many agents near the extreme values, bmind and b
max
d will
be much larger. An aggregate analysis cannot capture strong support or strong resistance coming
from individuals or groups, because in the aggregate calculation these two groups cancel each other
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out.
Figure 9 is a plot of percent change in utility level of individual domestic agents. At one
extreme, the agents with factor loadings in the neighborhood of bmind loose 18% of life-time utility,
while agents at the other extreme bmaxd gain of 16.7%. For type A (constant participants) in the
neighborhood of the A-set boundary, bDPd −
√
Kd, utility loss equals 6.7%. For Type A agents
in the neighborhood of another A-set boundary, bDSd +
√
Kd, the gain equals 6.2%. Utility does
not change for type B agents. The example shows that a reasonable loss in aggregate utility of
4.24% is consistent with a significant welfare loss for many individual agents. The aggregate utility
calculation cancels utility losses of some agents with utility gains of the others. It is, however, just
that, a calculation. Without a mechanism that allows a transfer from the agents who gain to the
agents who loose, liberalization policy may find strong opponents in the ranks of those who stand
to experience a large welfare loss.
It is easy to see how a minority with large losses in welfare could change government policy
when the political system allocates some power to subsets of voters that are less than 50% of the
vote. The welfare loss could be large enough so that the gain experienced by the majority is not
suﬃcient to overcome the political power of the minority. Note that this is not rent-seeking by
interest groups. All agents in Figures 8 and 9 are rational traders in an exchange economy. We
only need to specify a voting mechanism that allocates some power under some circumstances to
welfare-losing minorities to get the outcome that liberalization again depends on the change in
factor loadings and the idiosyncratic risk of the risky assets. Economies will rationally change their
liberalization policies as these variables change.
We can calculate the equivalent variation measure: Let λ be the percentage change in initial
wealth such that people enjoy the same level of utility under partial liberalization as under financial
autarchy14 In the example above when aggregate utility fell by 4.24%, the value of λ is 8.4 percent
of initial wealth.15 For a developed economy this is historically rare and is usually associated with
catastrophic events such as wars. Figure 10 is a plot of equivalent variation in wealth (i.e. λ) as
a function of the domestic participation fee assuming that all agents have identical initial wealth.
The plot shows the percentage by which initial wealth of the whole economy, and therefore of
14A similar measure is used in Obstfeld (1994).
15This economy has the same parameter values as for Figure 1, except error variance is σ2εd = 0.1, b
max
d = 5.5;
kdd = 0.1 and k
f
f = 0.1.
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each agent, must be increased so that the aggregate utility in the economy is the same under the
segmentation and partial liberalization. This number is higher in the case when domestic asset has
lower idiosyncratic variance and provides better hedging. In this experiment all agents receive the
same amount of additional wealth. Although this restores aggregate welfare in the economy, it does
not restore welfare of all agents. A change in welfare is diﬀerent across agents, so the compensation
required also varies. Giving the same amount to each agent may restore aggregate welfare, but will
not restore welfare of each individual agent. For some increase in wealth will not be suﬃcient, for
the others it will be too large and will increase their welfare by more than the original loss. We
compute equivalent variation at the agent level next.
Figure 11 is a plot of equivalent wealth variation for individual domestic agents. Agent factor
loading is on the x-axis. On the y-axis there is percent change in initial wealth that makes the
agent indiﬀerent between segmentation and liberalization. The eﬀect is stronger when domestic
asset is of higher quality. There are agents whose wealth must be increased by more than 20% to
compensate for welfare loss. For example, consider the previously discussed case of 4.24% loss in
aggregate welfare. In this case some agents loose up to 18% of their life-time utility. Aggregate
wealth must be increased by 8.4% in this case to return to the aggregate utility level enjoyed under
complete segmentation. Equivalent variation is even higher at individual level. Agents with the
largest utility loss (18%) require an increase in wealth of 34% so that they enjoy the same level of
utility as under segmentation. The calculations illustrate that a minority with substantial loss in
welfare can emerge, leading to a visible resistance to liberalization.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework for analyzing international financial market
segmentation. The model aims at explaining a government’s decision to erect an “Iron Curtain”
from a political economy standpoint, and not merely view such decisions as the product of rent-
seeking, agency costs, or irrationality. For an asset pricing model to explain existence of barriers it
is necessary to characterize agents who lose when the barriers are removed. We show how this can
be done when the standard Consumption CAPM is extended.
The equilibrium framework proposed in the first part of the paper is fairly general. We explicitly
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model the motives of economic agents who issue risky assets and of those who purchase them. The
model has three crucial features. First, the costs of being a participant in a risky asset market
are incorporated into the model. Second, the participation decision is endogenous. Third, the
agents are heterogeneous with respect to their endowment income. We then show that in this
setting partial liberalization has non-trivial welfare eﬀects. Allowing foreign investors to purchase
domestic securities changes demand for domestic assets, and therefore, their price. This, in turn,
aﬀects participation decision of domestic investors. We show how partial liberalization decision can
change composition of domestic risky asset market participants and impact their welfare.
In the next part of the paper we consider economies where asset and endowment payoﬀs are
generated by a single factor model. We study diﬀerence in welfare of domestic agents under complete
segmentation and partial liberalization regimes. There is a group of agents who do not participate
in the risky asset market either under segmentation or under liberalization. The welfare of these
agents is not aﬀected by the decision to open domestic market to foreign investors. We also identify
a group of domestic agents who enter the risky asset market under liberalization. Their utility is
higher under liberalization than under segmentation. There also is a group of agents, however,
who have higher utility when the markets are segmented. We conclude that partial liberalization
is not a Pareto-optimal policy. We go one step further. Not only there is a group of agents who
are worse-oﬀ under liberalization, but there are also cases when aggregate welfare at home is lower
if foreigners are allowed to purchase domestic securities. The welfare loss can be large.
Do we suggest that it is always in a country’s best interest to maintain investment barriers?
No, we do not. Our model shows the importance of risk sharing. Welfare is decreased when it
becomes too costly to participate in the risk sharing provided by the financial market. These
conclusions lead to two observations. First, the decision to maintain investment barriers and to
prohibit foreigners from purchasing domestic assets may be endogenous and can be regarded by
economists as an endogenous variable, and not as an exogenous political outcome. Second, the
opening and closing of a country to foreigners is a function of the distribution of risk and of the
risk sharing opportunities. Countries with optimistic distributions, where agents are raising capital
against future income, will tend to open. Countries with pessimistic distributions, where agents
are hedging against future loss will tend to close.
The second observation is directly related to policy recommendations. We argue that countries
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need to prepare well for implementing a liberalization policy. They need to adapt their policies
and institutions, and their financial systems. These arguments are similar to those expressed in
Fischer (1998), except we employ a theoretical model and can be more specific in identifying causes
of welfare loss. A country deliberating liberalization of its financial market must consider several
factors and policies. Risk sharing arrangements in the economy constitute one group of important
factors. If liberalization makes it more costly for domestic agents to participate in risk sharing,
because risky assets are more expensive, then there will be a utility loss among domestic agents.
Some domestic agents will even find it too expensive to participate in the liberalized domestic
risky asset market and will not hold any risky securities. This calls for policies that are aimed at
enhancing risk sharing simultaneously with opening up of domestic markets to foreign investors.
We leave several interesting extensions to further research. The model with entry costs and
endogenous participation developed in the first part of this paper can be used to analyze other
types of liberalization decisions. For example, it can be adapted to study welfare implications
of a policy where domestic firms are allowed to issue equity to foreign investors, but domestic
investors are not allowed to purchase foreign assets. The model can also be used to analyze the
case of complete liberalization, where foreign and domestic assets are available to both foreign
and domestic investors, but diﬀerent investors face diﬀerent entry costs. A third extension is to
incorporate taxation to study whether there exist re-distribution schemes that can compensate
agents for welfare loss. Such studies taken together will enhance our understanding of the political
economy of international finance.
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A Appendix: General Theory
Proposition 1 (Participant in market m) Under complete segmentation, when participating
in the risky asset market m (foreign or domestic), the investor consumes
chpS,m,0 =
1
1 +Rm
∙
eh + θh0S,m [zm −Rm · pS,m] +Rm
³
Wh0 − km
´
− ln δRm
a
(6)
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S,mσ
h
e,m
ii
at time 0. The vector of optimal post-trade holdings of risky assets is
θhpS,m =
1
a
Σ−1m
³
zm −Rm · pS,m − aσhe,m
´
. (7)
The remainder of wealth is invested in
θhpS,m,0 = Rm
³
Wh0 − c
hp
S,m,0 − p
0
S,m · θhpS,m − km
´
(8)
units of the risk-free bond. Consumption at time 1 equals
echpS,m,1 = eh + ez0mθhpS,m + θhpS,m,0. (9)
Participant in market m. The proof is based on the assumption of CARA preferences and
joint Normal distribution of random variables. Using the budget constraint, terminal consumption
is
echpS,m,1 = eh + ez0mθhpS,m +Rm ³Wh0 − chpS,m,0 − p0S,m · θhpS,m − km´ .
Since all random variables are jointly Normally distributed, terminal consumption has a normal
distribution with expected value and variance
E
hechpS,m,1i = eh + z0m · θhpS,m +Rm ³Wh0 − chpS,m,0 − p0S,m · θhpS,m − km´ ,
V ar
hechpS,m,1i = σ2eh + θhp0S,mΣmθhpS,m + 2θhp0S,m · σhe,m,
The optimization problem is solved using the property z ∼ N
¡
µ,σ2
¢
⇒ E [ez] = exp
©
µ+ 12σ
2
ª
,
and the results follow from the first order conditions.
Proposition 2 (Non-Participant in market m) Under complete segmentation, when not par-
ticipating in the risky asset market, the investor consumes
chnS,m,0 =
1
1 +Rm
∙
eh +RmW
h
0 −
1
2
aσ2eh −
ln δRm
a
¸
(10)
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and invests the remainder of wealth in
θhnS,m,0 = RmW
h
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Rm
1 +Rm
∙
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2
aσ2eh −
ln δRm
a
¸
(11)
units of the risk-free bond. A non-participant’s derived utility of wealth is
JnS,m
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¸
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Consumption at time 1 equals
echnS,m,1 = eh + θhnS,m,0. (13)
Non-Participant in market m. The proof is based on the assumption of CARA preferences
and joint Normal distribution of random variables. Non-participant in the risky asset market holds
risk-free asset. His terminal consumption, therefore, consists of the payoﬀ on the risk-free asset
(times the number of shares held), and the payoﬀ on the risky endowment. Terminal consumption
of non-participant has a Normal distribution with expected value and variance
E
hechpS,m,1i = eh + θhnS,m,0,
V ar
hechpS,m,1i = σ2eh ,
The optimization problem is solved using the property z ∼ N
¡
µ,σ2
¢
⇒ E [ez] = exp
©
µ+ 12σ
2
ª
,
and the results follow from the first order conditions.
Participation criterion under complete segmentation. An agent participates in the
risky asset market if and only if the derived utility of wealth under participation exceeds the
derived utility of wealth under non-participation,
JpS,m
h
Wh0
i
> JnS,m
h
Wh0
i
,
S2S,m (h)
2a
> RS,mkm,
where the last inequality is obtained by using the expressions for indirect utility functions and
simplifying.
Under partial liberalization, domestic participant solves the expected utility maximization prob-
lem
JpP,d
h
Wh0
i
= max
chP,d,0,θ
h
P,d,θ
h
P,d,0
n
−e−ac
h
P,d,0 − δEe−aechP,d,1o ,
Wh0 = c
h
P,d,0 + p
0
P,d · θhP,d + kd + θhP,d,0/Rd.
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with respect to three decision variables: time 0 consumption chP,0; time 0 post-trade holdings of
risky assets θhP,d; and time 0 investment in the bond, θ
h
P,d,0. The superscript p denotes the values
under the optimal policy for a participant and superscript n for non-participant.
Proposition 3 (Domestic Participant Under Partial Liberalization) Under partial liberal-
ization, when participating in the domestic risky asset market the domestic investor consumes
chpP,d,0 =
1
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at time 0. The vector of optimal post-trade holdings of risky assets is
θhpP,d =
1
a
Σ−1d
³
zd −Rd · pP,d − aσhe,d
´
. (15)
The remainder of wealth is invested in
θhpP,d,0 = Rd
³
Wh0 − c
hp
P,d,0 − p
0
P,d · θhpP,d − kd
´
(16)
units of the risk-free bond. Consumption at time 1 equals
echpP,d,1 = eh + ez0dθhpP,d + θhpP,d,0. (17)
Partial Liberalization: Domestic participant. The proof is based on the assumption of
CARA preferences and joint Normal distribution of random variables. Proof proceeds along exactly
the same lines as for the participant under complete segmentation.
Proposition 4 (Foreign Participant Under Partial Liberalization) When participating in
the partially liberalized risky asset market foreign investor consumes
chpP,f,0 =
1
1 +Rf
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The remainder of wealth is invested in
θhpP,f,0 = Rf
³
Wh0 − c
hp
P,f,0 − p
0
P · θhpP,f − kf
´
(20)
units of the risk-free bond. Consumption at time 1 equals
echpP,f,1 = eh + ez0θhpP,f + θhpP,f,0. (21)
Proof. The proof is based on the assumption of CARA preferences and joint Normal distribu-
tion of random variables. Proof proceeds along exactly the same lines as for the participant under
complete segmentation.
B Appendix: Single Factor Model
B.1 Complete Segmentation
Generalized Sharpe Ratio. The expression for S2S,m (h) is obtained by direct computation. For
all domestic investors, h ∈ D, Cov ¡eh, ezd¢ = bhd ·βd, and Cov ¡eh, ezf¢ = 0. For all foreign investors,
h ∈ F , Cov ¡eh, ezf¢ = bhf · βf , and Cov ¡eh, ezd¢ = 0. Also, Σ−1m = 1/V ar (ezm).
S2S,m (h) =
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´2
/
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2
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¢
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> 2aRmkm,
bMSm ≡
1
Pm (MS)
Z
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bhmdPm (h) .
B.2 Partial Liberalization
Computation of Pd
¡DpP ¢. For uniform distribution bhd ∼ Uniform ¡bmind , bmaxd ¢, PDF d ¡bhd¢ =
1/
¡
bmaxd − bmind
¢
, by direct computation:
Pd
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This gives Pd
¡DpP ¢ in terms of the price of the domestic risky asset, pP,d (a quantity determined in
equilibrium) and other parameters of the problem.
Computation of covariance:
Cov
hezd, eDpP i = Z
DpP
Cov
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¢ .
Generalized Sharpe Ratio:
S2P (h) =
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Computation of price of the foreign asset, pP,f .
Remark 8 In general, suppose A > 0 and x1 = BA −
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V ar [ezf ]q2aRfkfV ar [ezd]− (zd −RfpP,d)2
The price of foreign asset,
pP,f =
1
Rf
⎡
⎣zf −
aCov
hezf , eFpP i
Pf
¡FpP ¢
⎤
⎦⇒ [zf − pP,fRf ]Pf
¡FpP ¢ = aCov hezf , eFpP i
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[zf − pP,fRf ] =
2 [zf − pP,fRf ]
√
C
A
³
bmaxf − bminf
´ + aβf bmax + bmin2 − aβf 2B
√
C
A ·A
h
bmaxf − bminf
i
= aβf
bmax + bmin
2
+
2
£
[zf − pP,fRf ]A− aβfB
¤√
C
A ·A
³
bmaxf − bminf
´
= aβf
bmax + bmin
2
+
2
p
V ar [ezd] (zf − pP,fRf ) £aβf − aβf¤√C
A ·A
³
bmaxf − bminf
´
= aβf
bmax + bmin
2
.
Domestic Asset Price:
pP,d =
zdPd
¡DpP ¢+ zdPf ¡FpP ¢− aCov hezd, eDpP i− aCov hezd, eFpP i
RdPd
¡DpP ¢+RfPf ¡FpP ¢
=
zdPd
¡DpP ¢+ zdPf ¡FpP ¢− aCov hezd, eDpP i
RdPd
¡DpP ¢+RfPf ¡FpP ¢
⇒ (pP,dRd − zd) = −aβd
bmind + b
max
d
2
+ [zd − pP,dRf ]Pf
¡FpP ¢
where we use previously derived expressions for Pd
¡DpP ¢ and Cov hezd, eDpP i , Cov hezd, eFpP i = 0.
Since Rf = Rd,
zd − pP,dRd = aβd
bmind + b
max
d
2
£
1 + Pf
¡FpP ¢¤
B.3 Welfare: Domestic Investors
Analysis of Type A investors. Type A domestic investors participate in the domestic risky
asset market before and after partial liberalization. For such investors,
JpS,d
h
Wh0
i
= JnS,d
h
Wh
i
exp
(
− a
1 +Rd
"
S2S,d (h)
2a
− kdRd
#)
,
JpP,d
h
Wh0
i
= JnS,d
h
Wh
i
exp
(
− a
1 +Rd
"
S2P,d (h)
2a
− kdRd
#)
.
For an agent of this type, welfare under partial liberalization exceeds the welfare under complete
segmentation if and only if,
JpP,d
h
Wh0
i
≥ JpS,d
h
Wh0
i
⇐⇒ S2P,d (h) ≥ S2S,d (h)³
zd − pP,dRd − aβdbhd
´2
≥
³
zd − pS,dRd − aβdbhd
´2
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Proof (Aggregate Welfare of Type A Domestic Agents). The Theorem states that if the
center of mass of the domestic economy under complete segmentation is positive, bDSd > 0, there
exist such domestic and foreign economies that the total utility of domestic investors of Type A
decreases with partial liberalization.
To prove that such case exists it is suﬃcient to provide one example. Aggregate welfare of Type
A domestic investors decreases in the following numerical example. Parameter values are: a = 0.5,
δ = 0.99. Domestic economy: bmind = −4, bmaxd = 5; For all ∀h ∈ D : eh = bhd , Wh0 = 2, σ2εhd = 1;
kd = 0.55, Rd = 1, zd = 1, βd = 1, σ
2
εd = 1. Foreign economy: b
min
f = −2, bmaxf = 4; For all
∀h ∈ F : eh = bhf , Wh0 = 2, σ2εhf = 1; kf = 0.01, Rf = 1, zf = 1, βf = 1, σ
2
εf = 1. Segmented and
partial liberalization equilibria in the domestic market are:
pS,d = 0.75, DS,d = (−4,−1.59762) ∪ (2.59762, 5) ,
pP,d = 0.872406, DP,d = (−4,−1.84243) ∪ (2.35281, 5) .
A [D] = (−4,−1.84243) ∪ (2.59762, 5) .
In this example, aggregate welfare of Type A domestic investors falls after partial liberalization,
JAS,d = −10.5939 > JAP,d = −10.9122.
This is no the only possible set of parameter values. There are infinitely many economies in which
the theorem holds. Q.E.D.
Remark (Aggregate Welfare of Type A Domestic Agents). We briefly comment on the
diﬃculty of analytical characterization of aggregate utility in the model.
Definition 9 The error function erf (z) is the integral of the Gaussian distribution,
erf (z) =
2√
π
Z z
0
e−t
2dt.
The following relationships hold:
lim
z→+∞
erf (z) = 1, erf (y) = 2Φ
³√
2 · y
´
− 1,
where Φ (·) is the standard Normal cumulative density function. The imaginary error function
erf i (z) is defined as
erf i (z) ≡ erf (z · i) /i.
40
To compute aggregate welfare for a set of participants we need to integrate the individual’s
indirect utility function over the set. For example, total utility of domestic Type A agents under
segmentation, JAS,d, is given by
JAS,d =
"Z bDPd −√Kd
bmind
JpS,d
£
Wh0
¤
bmaxd − bmind
dbhd +
Z bmaxd
b
DS
d +
√
Kd
JpS,d
£
Wh0
¤
bmaxd − bmind
dbhd
#
.
This integral cannot be expressed in terms of elementary (analytic) functions. The structure of the
integral as the same as the integral over the Normal density, which, too, does not have an analytic
expression. To see this, observe that the function JpS,d
£
Wh0
¤
is proportional to the term that has
the same structure as the Normal density:
JpS,d
h
Wh0
i
∝ exp
½
− a
1 +Rd
∙
bhd −
a
2
³
bhd
´2
+
1
2a
S2S,d (h)
¸¾
.
Just as an integral of the Normal density over a set can be written using the error function, the
integral of the indirect utility function can be written using Erfi (·).
Integration of utility of non-participants. In the single factor model, expected endowment
payoﬀ is eh = bhm. Integrating derived utility of wealth over an interval (a set of agents) yields:
Z B
A
JnP,m
£
Wh
¤
bmaxm − bminm
dbhm =
δ (1 +Rm)
3/2
a (bmaxm − bminm )
r
π
2
× exp
"
−
1 + 2aRmW
h
0 − a2σ2εhm + 2Rm ln δRm
2 (1 +Rm)
#
×
"
Erfi
Ã
−1 + a ·Ap
2 (1 +Rm)
!
− Erfi
Ã
−1 + a ·Bp
2 (1 +Rm)
!#
.
Integration of utility of participants (under segmentation). In the single factor model,
expected endowment payoﬀ is eh = bhm. Integrating derived utility of wealth over an interval (a set
of agents) yields:Z B
A
JpS,m
£
Wh
¤
bmaxm − bminm
dbhm
=
δ (1 +Rm)
3/2
a (bmaxm − bminm )
r
π
2
s
β2m + σ2εm
σ2εm
× exp
½
− a
1 +Rm
∙
Rm
³
Wh0 − km
´
+
Rm ln δRm
a
¸¾
× exp
½
a2
2 (1 +Rm)
σ2εhm
¾
× exp
⎧
⎨
⎩−
³
−1 + abMS,mm
´
β2m + σ
2
εm
2 (1 +Rm)σ2εm
⎫
⎬
⎭
×
⎡
⎣Erfi
⎡
⎣
³
−1 + abMS,mm
´
β2m + (−1 + a ·A)σ2εmq
2 (1 +Rm)σ2εm
¡
β2m + σ2εm
¢
⎤
⎦− Erfi
⎡
⎣
³
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β2m + (−1 + a ·B)σ2εmq
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¢
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⎦
⎤
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A similar expression holds for the case of partial liberalization. For example, to obtain the expres-
sion for integration of utility of domestic participants under liberalization (m = d), replace b
MS,m
m
in the expression above with bDPd .
Proof (Aggregate Welfare of Domestic Agents). The Theorem states that if the center of
mass of the domestic economy under complete segmentation is positive, bDSd > 0, there exist such
domestic and foreign economies that the total utility of domestic investors is lower under partial
liberalization than under complete segmentation.
To prove that such case exists it is suﬃcient to provide one example. In the following numerical
example aggregate welfare of domestic investors is lower under partial liberalization than under
complete segmentation. Parameter values are: a = 0.5, δ = 0.99. Domestic economy: bmind = −4,
bmaxd = 5.5; For all ∀h ∈ D : eh = bhd , Wh0 = 2, σ2εhd = 1; kd = 0.55, Rd = 1, zd = 1, βd = 1, σ
2
εd = 0.1
(this is relatively low level of domestic asset idiosyncratic risk). Foreign economy: bminf = −2,
bmaxf = 4; For all ∀h ∈ F : eh = bhf , Wh0 = 2, σ2εhf = 1; kf = 0.1, Rf = 1, zf = 1, βf = 1, σ
2
εf = 1.
Segmented and partial liberalization equilibria in the domestic market are:
pS,d = 0.625,
DS,d = (−4,−0.805635) ∪ (2.30563, 5.5) ,
pP,d = 0.788,
DP,d = (−4,−1.13204) ∪ (1.97923, 5.5)
In this example, aggregate welfare of domestic investors is lower under partial liberalization than
under complete segmentation.
JS,d = −13.4421 > JP,d = −14.0126.
This is no the only possible set of parameter values. There are infinitely many economies in which
the theorem holds. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1. Boundaries of Participation Set of Domestic Investors under Complete Segmentation
as a Function of Domestic Participation Cost, kdd. Two cases of domestic idiosyncratic volatility
(error variance) are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red), and “High,” σ
2
εd = 1.0 (blue). High idiosyncratic
volatility diminishes the set of participating agents because the benefits from participation are lower.
Other parameter values are: a = 0.5, δ = 0.99. Domestic economy: bmind = −4, bmaxd = 5, eh = bhd
∀h ∈ D, Wh0 = 2 ∀h ∈ D, σ2εhd = 1 ∀h ∈ D, k
d
d = 0.55, Rd = 1, zd = 1, βd = 1. Foreign economy:
bminf = −2, bmaxf = 4, eh = bhf ∀h ∈ F , Wh0 = 2 ∀h ∈ F , σ2εhf = 1 ∀h ∈ F , k
f
f = 0.01, Rf = 1, zf = 1,
βf = 1, σ2εf = 1.
Figure 2. The Set of Domestic Participating Agents. The x-axis is the agent’s factor loading,
bhd . The cases shown are: Complete Segmentation (blue), Partial Liberalization when initial center
of mass is positive (green), and Partial Liberalization when initial center of mass is negative (red).
Figure 3. Change in Aggregate Welfare of Domestic Type A Investors as a Function of Do-
mestic Participation Cost. Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown.
Parameter values are: “High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green);
“Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1.
Figure 4. Change in Aggregate Welfare of Domestic Type A Investors as a Function of For-
eign Participation Cost. Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown.
Parameter values are: “High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green);
“Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except that domestic
participation cost is fixed, kdd = 0.55.
Figure 5. Change in Aggregate Domestic Welfare as a Function of Foreign Participation Cost.
Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Parameter values are:
“High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red).
Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; domestic participation fee
is fixed, kdd = 0.55.
Figure 6. Change in Aggregate Domestic Welfare as a Function of Domestic Participation
Cost. Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Parameter values are:
“High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red).
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Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; foreign participation fee
is fixed: kff = 0.1.
Figure 7. Utility of Domestic Agents Under Complete Segmentation and Partial Liberalization.
The x-axis is the agent’s factor loading, bhd . The y-axis is the level of lifetime utility of consumption.
Blue line is utility under segmentation; green line is utility under partial liberalization. Parameter
values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; foreign participation fee is fixed: k
f
f = 0.1;
domestic error variance is σ2εd = 0.1.
Figure 8. Percent Change in Aggregate Utility of Domestic Agents. The y-axis is the percent
change in level of aggregate utility of domestic agents. Parameter values are: “High” error variance
σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values
are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; domestic participation fee is fixed, k
d
d = 0.55.
Figure 9. Percent Change in Utility of Domestic Agents. The x-axis is the agent’s factor
loading, bhd . The y-axis is the percent change in level of lifetime utility of consumption. Parameter
values are the same as for Figure 7.
Figure 10. Equivalent Wealth Variation for Domestic Economy as a Function of Domestic
Participation Cost. Two cases of domestic idiosyncratic volatility are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1
(red), and “Intermediate,” σ2εd = 0.7 (green). Parameter values are the same as for Figure 7.
Figure 11. Equivalent Wealth Variation for Individual Domestic Agents. The x-axis is the
agent’s factor loading bhd . The y-axis shows percent change in initial wealth that makes the agent
indiﬀerent between segmentation and liberalization. A positive value indicates that under liber-
alization an agent needs to receive additional wealth to compensate for utility loss. Two cases of
domestic idiosyncratic volatility are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red), and “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7
(green). Parameter values are the same as for Figure 7.
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Figure 1: Boundaries of Participation Set of Domestic Investors under Complete Segmentation as a
Function of Domestic Participation Cost, kdd. Two cases of domestic idiosyncratic volatility (error
variance) are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red), and “High,” σ
2
εd = 1.0 (blue). High idiosyncratic
volatility diminishes the set of participating agents because the benefits from participation are
lower. Other parameter values are: a = 0.5, δ = 0.99. Domestic economy: bmind = −4, bmaxd = 5,
eh = bhd ∀h ∈ D, Wh0 = 2 ∀h ∈ D, σ2εhd = 1 ∀h ∈ D, k
d
d = 0.55, Rd = 1, zd = 1, βd = 1. Foreign
economy: bminf = −2, bmaxf = 4, eh = bhf ∀h ∈ F , Wh0 = 2 ∀h ∈ F , σ2εhf = 1 ∀h ∈ F , k
f
f = 0.01,
Rf = 1, zf = 1, βf = 1, σ2εf = 1.
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Figure 2: The Set of Domestic Participating Agents. The x-axis is the agent’s factor loading, bhd .
The cases shown are: Complete Segmentation (blue), Partial Liberalization when initial center of
mass is positive (green), and Partial Liberalization when initial center of mass is negative (red).
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Figure 3: Change in Aggregate Welfare of Domestic Type A Investors as a Function of Domestic
Participation Cost. Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Param-
eter values are: “High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,”
σ2εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Change in Aggregate Welfare of Domestic Type A Investors as a Function of Foreign
Participation Cost. Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Pa-
rameter values are: “High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green);
“Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except that domestic
participation cost is fixed, kdd = 0.55.
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Figure 5: Change in Aggregate Domestic Welfare as a Function of Foreign Participation Cost.
Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Parameter values are:
“High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red).
Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; domestic participation fee
is fixed, kdd = 0.55.
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Figure 6: Change in Aggregate Domestic Welfare as a Function of Domestic Participation Cost.
Three cases of idiosyncratic risk of the domestic asset, σ2εd , are shown. Parameter values are:
“High” error variance σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red).
Other parameter values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; foreign participation fee
is fixed: kff = 0.1.
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Figure 7: Utility of Domestic Agents Under Complete Segmentation and Partial Liberalization. The
x-axis is the agent’s factor loading, bhd . The y-axis is the level of lifetime utility of consumption.
Blue line is utility under segmentation; green line is utility under partial liberalization. Parameter
values are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; foreign participation fee is fixed: k
f
f = 0.1;
domestic error variance is σ2εd = 0.1.
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Figure 8: Percent Change in Aggregate Utility of Domestic Agents. The y-axis is the percent
change in level of aggregate utility of domestic agents. Parameter values are: “High” error variance
σ2εd = 1 (blue); “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green); “Low,” σ
2
εd = 0.1 (red). Other parameter values
are the same as for Figure 1, except bmaxd = 5.5; domestic participation fee is fixed, k
d
d = 0.55.
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Figure 9: Percent Change in Utility of Domestic Agents. The x-axis is the agent’s factor loading,
bhd . The y-axis is the percent change in level of lifetime utility of consumption. Parameter values
are the same as for Figure 7.
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Figure 10: Equivalent Wealth Variation for Domestic Economy as a Function of Domestic Partici-
pation Cost. Two cases of domestic idiosyncratic volatility are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red), and
“Intermediate,” σ2εd = 0.7 (green). Parameter values are the same as for Figure 7.
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Figure 11: Equivalent Wealth Variation for Individual Domestic Agents. The x-axis is the agent’s
factor loading bhd . The y-axis shows percent change in initial wealth that makes the agent indiﬀerent
between segmentation and liberalization. A positive value indicates that under liberalization an
agent needs to receive additional wealth to compensate for utility loss. Two cases of domestic
idiosyncratic volatility are shown: “Low,” σ2εd = 0.1 (red), and “Intermediate,” σ
2
εd = 0.7 (green).
Parameter values are the same as for Figure 7.
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